Operation Zarb E Azb Essay Contest

June 15 marked the two year anniversary of Pakistan’s counterterrorism operation Zarb-e-Azb, which has now entered its final phase. To commemorate the occasion, the director general (DG) of the Pakistani military’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), General Asim Bajwa, made an elaborate presentation in which he shared the military’s achievements and sacrifices against terrorists in the country.

What is crucial to remember, however, is that there are always two sides to a story – one that is told and one that is not communicated clearly to the public. What has been told to the citizens of Pakistan regarding Zarb-e-Azb – that is, its successes – appears to be straightforward. It is essential now to weed out the “untold” aspects of Bajwa’s presser to understand the future challenges facing Pakistan’s war against home-grown extremism and terrorism.

As far as the successes are concerned, three achievements merit particular attention. First, Zarb-e-Azb has fully restored the writ of the state and currently no area in Pakistan is under militant occupation, barring a few scattered pockets of influence and sleeper cells. Pakistani territory has largely been retaken from militants. Second, the operation has led to a significant change in Pakistan’s internal political discourse — namely, the conclusion that appeasing militants through negotiations or reconciliation is futile. These practices alone cannot bring peace, unless initiated from a position of strength.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The third and most important achievement concerns the state garnering popular support in countering terrorism. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, under General Raheel Sharif’s watch, has to an extent regained public trust in the state and its institutions. It has revived a sense of confidence in the common man that the state has resolved to bring peace by defeating terrorism.

Having recognized the achievements of Zarb-e-Azb, however, it is important to look at the aspects that didn’t feature in the ISPR press conference. By doing so, we can try to outline the challenges Pakistan may face in countering terrorism in the future.

First, Zarb-e-Azb has certainly dismantled and dislodged Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but it has not yet been destroyed. TTP has relocated to and resurrected its infrastructure in Afghanistan, enabling it to become a low-intensity long-term threat to Pakistan due to cross-border support and sanctuaries. In other words, the terrorist threat to Pakistan is far from defeated—which has been one of the core objectives of Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Second, as estimates independent of those presented in General Bajwa’s presser also suggest, there is no doubt that terrorist violence is at an all-time low, but worryingly enough intolerance and extremism appear to have increased within Pakistani society. The ever-widening gulf between Pakistan’s “secular-liberals” and the right-wing “Islamists” has been exacerbated alarmingly, further shrinking the common space. The erosion of the middle ground is alarming; it will increase the already high level of polarization and politico-religious fissures in society.

Third, ambitious counterterrorism operations are good opportunities for states to rebuild their image and correct negative public perceptions, both at home and abroad. Unfortunately, contrary to the fanfare generated during Zarb-e-Azb’s launch, with it being termed as the “mother of all operations,” it has in fact failed to live up to the media hype created by the ISPR. Beyond local consumption, it has not won Pakistan much recognition regionally and internationally. Poor strategic communication and dull diplomacy are to be blamed for this failure; counting Pakistan’s sacrifices in the war on terror and playing victim to international and domestic security dynamics have merely won hollow platitudes.

Furthermore, prior to the launch of the operation, public opinion favored rooting out radicalization and extremism from society’s midst, which could ultimately result in defeating militancy and terrorism long-term. However, beyond tactical measures and cosmetic steps, no serious efforts seem to have been made to tackle the two-headed monster of extremism and radicalization. Criminalization of hate speech and the ban on extremist literature were the most crucial steps to be taken in this direction. However, there is still no concerted effort to devise a national counter-radicalization policy. Lacking this, the gains of Zarb-e-Azb are fragile and possibly even reversible.

Over time, terrorism has evolved and morphed from a security threat to an ideological challenge. Consequentially, Pakistan’s battlefield has expanded from the literal physical space to the symbolic ideological space. In the latter, the war of narratives is fought through ideas. However, Pakistan’s strategy in the war of ideas, the basis for countering an ideological threat, appears to be missing. Without this, promoting moderation and inter-faith harmony are unachievable goals. Pakistan lacks a coherent, forward-looking narrative, which should reflect the vision of its founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who envisioned Pakistan to be a moderate Muslim state.

Finally, Zarb-e-Azb was an opportunity to revive the dysfunctional National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which could meet the competing demands of different law enforcement and intelligence agencies through central coordination in countering terrorism. However, NACTA remains low on the governments’ priorities as stakeholders from both military and civilian setups continue to fight over its control and ownership.

In addition, the present situation with the criminal justice system is no better. Similarly, the Anti-Terrorism Courts’ performance remains less than ideal and leaves much to be desired. The military tried to overcome these gaps through ad hoc arrangements of military courts and special policing powers granted to them under Article 245 of the Constitution. Much-needed institutional reforms in the police and judiciary are still lacking. Hence, despite doing well against the terrorist threat on tactical levels, the institutional capacity of counterterrorism with clearly demarcated and well-defined professional functions remains absent.

From a strategic point of view, a good operation is short, focused, and limited in its objectives. An unrealistically overambitious operation with vaguely defined objectives can turn a timely victory into a prolonged defeat. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has achieved its military and security objectives and that is how it will be remembered. It will also be remembered as the legacy of General Raheel Sharif, and it will be an illustrious one. Sharif has returned hope to the people of Pakistan and now the operation should be taken to its logical conclusion by allowing displaced families to return to their homes respectfully.

Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.

Radd-ul-Fasaad fits into the Pakistani army's broad counterterrorism campaign. Ever since it launched Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014, the number of attacks by militants fell by 27 percent in 2016 as compared with 2015. By layering Radd-ul-Fasaad upon the still-ongoing Zarb-e-Azb, the carnage is likely to continue decreasing (though to be sure, this comes at the cost of having fewer troops to devote toward countering India, which is why Bajwa will try to avoid antagonizing New Delhi as long as the operations are underway).

The Fight Against Militant Ideology

Of course, military operations form just one prong of the country's counterterrorism strategy. A second component targets militancy's ideological underpinnings and involves reforming the thousands of madrassas scattered across the country. After the December 2014 Army Public School assault that killed more than 140 people, many of them children, in the deadliest act of terrorism in Pakistan's history, the government put forth a comprehensive National Action Plan to tackle terrorism. Among its key provisions was the registration and regulation of madrassas, Muslim educational institutions, to monitor their curricula and sources of funding.

Some estimates suggest that of the 35,000 or so madrassas in Pakistan, 95 percent are benign. They offer a religion-based education that caters to a wide segment of the population, including the poor, who are attracted to free or reduced-price tuition and boarding. But the emphasis on madrassa reform in the plan evinces government concerns about those schools teaching extremist interpretations of religion (in fact, many of the first generation of Taliban fighters were educated in Pakistani madrassas).

Thanks in part to political factors, the pace of madrassa reform has been slow. In 2001, the government established the Pakistan Madrasah Education Board with the aim of building "model" madrassas. But 16 years later, the board has established only three madrassas in the country. Madrassa reform is not popular among the conservative and politically powerful religious groups that make up key support for the governing Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party. Since the party needs that bloc to retain power, it has been reluctant to tackle the issue. Especially as the PML-N is beginning its campaign for 2018 national and state elections, the party likely will not prioritize madrassa reform this year, either.

The political calculation becomes apparent in Punjab, which has the most madrassas of any Pakistani province. Since the National Action Plan was introduced in 2015, only two of the almost 14,000 madrassas in the province have been shuttered, compared with at least 2,300 madrassa closures in Sindh, a province governed by the opposition Pakistan People's Party.

Military operations such as Radd-ul-Fasaad and ideological measures such as madrassa reform are only two components of Pakistan's extensive and complex counterterrorism strategy. The army and the government both recognize that an approach based solely on military intervention is unlikely to end the threat of anti-state militancy. But until Islamabad accrues the political capital to pursue other reforms, while militancy will diminish, it also will endure.


Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *